Debra S. Retherford v. AT&T Communications of the Mountain States, Inc.; Cathy Bateson; Louise johnson; Vickie Randall; Doe I through X : Reply Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1989
Debra S. Retherford v. AT&T Communications of
the Mountain States, Inc.; Cathy Bateson; Louise
johnson; Vickie Randall; Doe I through X : Reply
Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Richard M. Hymas; Nielsen and Senior; Attorney for Defendants/Appellees.
Richard W. Perkins; Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Retherford v. AT&T Communications of the Mountain States, No. 890464.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2744
DOC'/.VTNT 
KF'J 
45.9 
.S9 
DOCKET NO. 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
BRIEF 
i&W-i 
PERKINS, SCHWOBE & McLACHLAN 
Richard W. Perkins (2567) 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
343 South 4th East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-6808 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DEBRA S. RETHERFORD, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
AT&T COMMUNICATIONS OF THE 
MOUNTAIN STATES, INC.; 
CATHY BATESON; LOUISE 
JOHNSON; VICKIE RANDALL; 
DOE I THROUGH DOE X, 
Defendants and Appellees, 
* * * * * * * * * 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 890464 
Priority No. 16 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
Richard M. Hyraas 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorney for Defendants/ 
Appellees 
60 E. So. Temple, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
Richard W. Perkins 
PERKINS, SCHWOBE & McLACHLAN 
Attorney for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant 
343 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, Ufcj*h„. 8^  
Telephone: (8j 
SEP 7 1990 
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah 
PERKINS, SCHWOBE & McLACHLAN 
Richard W. Perkins (2567) 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
343 South 4th East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-6808 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * 
DEBRA S. RETHERFORD, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
AT&T COMMUNICATIONS OF THE 
MOUNTAIN STATES, INC.; 
CATHY BATESON; LOUISE 
JOHNSON; VICKIE RANDALL; 
DOE I THROUGH DOE X, 
Defendants and Appellees, 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 890464 
Priority No. 16 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
Richard M. Hymas 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorney for Defendants/ 
Appellees 
60 E. So. Temple, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
Richard W. Perkins 
PERKINS, SCHWOBE & McLACHLAN 
Attorney for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant 
343 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-6808 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 4 
ARGUMENT 5 
I THE COURT SHOULD RECOGNIZE A CAUSE OF 
ACTION FOR WRONGFUL TERMINATION IN 
VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY IN THIS CASE 5 
II PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ARE NOT PRE-
EMPTED BY FEDERAL LABOR LAW 17 
III PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ARE NOT 
OTHERWISE BARRED 21 
CONCLUSION 23 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 23 
AUTHORITIES AND CASES CITED 
Ackerman v. Western Elec. Co.. 
860 F.2d 1514 (9th Cir. 1988) 18 
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. 
415 U.S. 4836 (1974) 17 
Beehive Medical Electronics, Inc. v. Industrial Comm. 
583 P.2d 53 (Utah 1978) 8, 12 
Bennett v. Hardy 
784 P.2d 1258 (Wash. 1990) 11 
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd. 
771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989) 16, 20 
- i -
AUTHORITIES & CASES CITED (Cont.) 
Page 
Bruffet v. Warner Communictions, Inc* 
692 F.2d 910 (3rd Cir. 1982) 22 
Call v* Scott Brass, Inc* 
553 N.E. 2d 1225 (Ind. App. 1990) 8 
Caterpillar, Inc* v. Williams 
107 S. Ct. 2425 (1987) 20 
Chavez v. Manville Products Corp* 
777 P.2d 371 (N.M. 1989) 7 
Cummins v* EG&G Sealor, Inc* 
690 F. Supp. 134 (D. R.I. 1988). ...5, 7 
Dare v* Montana Petroleum 
687 P.2d 1015 (Mont. 1984) 14 
Davis v* Utah Power & Light Co. 
Civ. No. 87-C-0659G (D. Utah 1988) 15 
Dougherty v* Parsec 
872 F.2d 766 (6th Cir. 1988) 18 
Eitmann v* New Orleans Public Service, Inc, 
730 F.2d 359 (5th Cir* 1984) 20 
Glass Molders v, Wickes Companies 
707 F. Supp. 174 (D. N. J. 1989 18 
Greeley v. Miami Valley Maint. Contr* 
551 N.E. 2d 981 (Ohio 1990) ...8, 14 
Greiss v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. 
776 P.2d 752 (Wyo. 1989) 14 
Grzyb v. Evans 
700 S.W. 2d 399 (Ky. 1985) 7 
Guyette v. Stauffer Chemical Co. 
518 F. Supp. 521 (D. N.J. 1981) 22 
Harrison v. Edison Bros. Apparel Stores, Inc. 
724 F. Supp. 1185 (D. N.C. 1989) - 7 
- ii -
AUTHORITIES & CASES CITED (Cont.) 
e 
Helmick v. Cincinnati Word Processing 
543 NE 2d 1212 (Ohio 1989) 16 
Holien v. Sears Roebuck & Co. 
689 P.2d 1292 (Ore. 1984) 14 
Jackson v. Consolidated Rail Corp. 
538 A.2d 1310 (N.J. App. 1988) 17 
Jackson v. So. Cal. Gas Co. 
881 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1989) 18 
K-Mart Corp. v. Posneck 
732 P.2d 1364 (Nev. 1987) 14 
Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co. 
461 F. Supp. 894 (D. N.J. 1978) 22 
Lally v. Copygraphics 
413 A.2d 960 (N.J. App. 1980), aff'd Lally v. 
Copygraphics, 428 A.2d 1317 (D. N.J. 1981) 8 
Lapinad v. Pacific Oldsmobile - GMC, Inc. 
679 F. Supp. 981 (D. Haw. 1988) 7 
Leong v. Hilton Hotels 
689 F. Supp. 1565 (D. Haw. 1988) 7, 22 
Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc. 
108 S. Ct. 1877 (1988) 17. 18 
Lui v. Intercontinental Hotels Corp. 
634 F. Supp. 684 (D. Haw. 1986) 7 
Mahoney v. Crocker Natl. Bank 
571 F. Supp. 287 (D. Cal. 1983) 7 
Malia v. RCA Corp. 
794 F.2d 909 (3rd Cir. 1986) 18, 20, 22 
Malone v. Safeway Stores 
698 F. Supp. 207 (D. Ore. 1987) 18 
- iii -
AUTHORITIES & CASES CITED (Cont.) 
Page 
McCool v. Hillhaven Corp. 
777 P.2d 1013 (Ore. App. 1989) 8 
Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co. 
778 P.2d 744 (Idaho 1989) 14 
Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc. 
473 NE 2d 1280 (111. 1984) 14 
O'Shea v. Detroit News 
887 F.2d 683 (6th Cir. 1989) 18 
Panto.ja v. Texas Gas 
890 F.2d 955 (7th Cir. 1989) 18 
Parner v. Americana Hotels, Inc. 
652 P.2d 625 (Haw. 1982) 7, 14 
Petermann v. International Brotherhood 
344 P.2d 25 (Cal. App. 1959) 13 
Phipps v. Clark Oil 
396 NW 2d 588 (Minn. App. 1986), aff'd Phipps 
v. Clark Oil, 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1987) 5, 14 
Placos v. Cosmair, Inc. 
517 F. Supp. 1287 (D. N.Y. 1981) 22 
Ro.io v. Kliger 
257 Cal. Rptr. 158 (Cal. App. 1989) 11 
Salazar v. Furr's Inc. 
629 F. Supp. 1403 (D. N.M. 1986) 7 
Sauers v. Salt Lake County 
735 F. Supp. 381 (D. Ut. 1990) 15 
Schroeder v. Dayton-Hudson Corp. 
448 F. Supp. 910 (D. Mich. 1977) 7 
Tash v. Houston 
254 N.W. 2d 579 (Mich. App. 1977) 22 
Vigil v. Arzola 
699 P.2d 613 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983) 7 
- iv -
AUTHORITIES & CASES CITED (Cont.) 
Page 
Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem. Hosp. 
710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985) 14, 22 
Wells v. General Motors Corp. 
881 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989) 20 
Wiggins v. Eastern Ass. Coal Corp. 
357 SE 2d 745 (W. Va. 1987) 8, 14 
Windfield v. Groen Div. 
890 F.2d 764 (5th Cir. 1989) 20 
Wolk v. Saks Fifth Ave., Inc. 
728 F.2d 221 (3rd Cir. 1984) 7 
Yatvin v. Madison Metro. School Dist. 
840 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1988).. 16 
Zappa v. Seiver 
706 P.2d 440 (Cal. App. 1985) 22 
STATUTES 
Constitution Utah, Art. I, Section 11 .•••.••... 12 
Constitution Utah, Art. IV, Section 1 .7, 12 
Utah Code Annot. Section 34-35-2(15) 9 
Utah Code Annot. Section 34-35-6 (1) (a) ( i ) 10 
Utah Code Annot. Section 34-35-7.1(15) 3, 11 
29 USC Section 185 (LMRA Sec. 301) 17, 18 
- v -
PERKINS, SCHWOBE & McLACHLAN 
Richard W. Perkins (2567) 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
343 South 4th East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-6808 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * 
DEBRA S. RETHERFORD, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
AT&T COMMUNICATIONS OF THE 
MOUNTAIN STATES, INC.; 
CATHY BATESON; LOUISE 
JOHNSON; VICKIE RANDALL; 
DOE I THROUGH DOE X, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 890464 
Priority No. 16 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Upon pages 1 - 3 of the Brief of Appellees, Defendants 
have attempted to restate the issues which are presented on 
this appeal, although Defendants have indicated no disagreement 
with the statement of the issues which appears on pages 1 - 3 
of the Brief of Appellant. 
Defendants' statement of the issues on this appeal are 
defective as follows: 
1. Paragraph 1 of Defendants1 Statement of the Issues 
contains an underlying presumption that the Utah Anti-Discrim-
ination Act (UADA), provides an "exclusive mechanism" for 
remedying employment retaliation. The question of whether the 
UADA provides the exclusive remedy for employment retaliation is 
the very issue which is presented on this appeal, as indicated 
by paragraph 3 of Plaintiff's Statement of the Issues. 
2. Paragraph 2 of Defendants' Statement of the Issues 
contains an underlying presumption that Plaintiff had a remedy 
for her termination under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. 
Plaintiff submits that she did not have a remedy under the 
Collective Bargaining Agreement in this case because of the 
particular way in which her termination of employment came 
about, i.e., through Defendants1 harassing Plaintiff into an 
emotional disability. Further, the Collective Bargaining 
Agreement did not provide, as Defendants contend, a remedy 
for "termination in violation of public policy", because 
there is no language in the Collective Bargaining Agreement 
to that effect, and because the cause of action is, by 
definition, an independent right under state law which is not 
defined by any contractual relationship between the parties. 
3. Contrary to paragraph 3 of Defendants' Statement 
of the Issues, Plaintiff's claims are not based upon "sexual 
discrimination"; they are based solely upon Defendants' 
retaliation against Plaintiff. 
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4. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of Defendants' Statement of the 
Issues contain an underlying presumption that Plaintiff's claims 
are "substantially dependent upon analysis...of the Collective 
Bargaining agreement." Again, this is not a fact which Defen-
dants are entitled to presume, but is the very issue which is 
before the Court. 
5. Paragraph 6 of Defendants' Statement of the Issues 
contains an underlying presumption that Plaintiff's claims for 
negligent employment, breach of implied contract, and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress were filed "more than 
four years after the events which give rise to those claims 
first occurred." There is an issue of fact in this case as 
to when those causes of action first accrued. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
Plaintiff agrees that this Court's interpretation of the 
UADA's exclusive remedy provision is potentially dispositive of 
certain issues in this case. However, of crucial importance is 
the fact that that statute was amended by the 1990 Session of 
the Utah Legislature, effective April 24, 1990. Utah Code 
Annotated, Sec. 34-35-7.1(15) now states: 
The procedures contained in this section 
are the exclusive remedy under state law 
for employment discrimination based upon 
race, color, sex, retaliation, pregnancy, 
child birth, or pregnancy-related conditions, 
age, religion, national origin, or handicap. 
(Emphas is added). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On pages 4-7 of the Brief of Appellees, Defendants 
attempt to state a few of the facts of this case, although 
Defendants indicate no disagreement with the Statement of Facts 
which appears upon pages 5-22 of the Brief of Appellant. 
Defendants' Statement of Facts is defective as follows: 
1. Contrary to paragraph 4 of Defendants' Statement of 
Facts, the determination of AT&T's EEO Office in regard to 
Plaintiff's first sexual harassment complaint was not that 
"there had been no sexual harassment". The determination 
speaks for itself, and cannot reasonably be construed as 
Defendants have construed it. (R. 238-239). 
2. In paragraph 6 of Defendants' Statement of Facts, 
the words: "In early 1986, when she was able to come back 
to work, she...requested that AT&T transfer her to a different 
office," are incorrect. Plaintiff was never "able to come 
back to work." Plaintiff was advised by her psychiatrist that 
she would be permanently unable to return to work with the 
people who had caused the panic in her. (R. 219). Nor did 
Plaintiff request a transfer to Boise, Idaho. The first 
that Plaintiff heard of such a transfer was on March 12, 1986, 
when Plaintiff was informed she would have ten days to report 
for work to Boise, or be terminated. (R. 219-220). Plaintiff 
also denies that "AT&T had no other office for operators in 
Utah." (R. 242). 
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3. The statement in paragraph 9 of Defendants' Statement 
of Facts that "Retherford did not appeal the grievance to Step 
III" is inaccurate. Plaintiff did everything she could to 
prosecute her Union grievance, but the Union allowed the 
grievance to lapse. (R. 220-221). However, this factual dis-
pute is irrelevant to this appeal because Plaintiff has alleged 
only claims which arise from independent, non-negotiable rights 
under state law. 
A R G U M E N T 
I. 
THE COURT SHOULD RECOGNIZE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR WRONGFUL 
TERMINATION IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY IN THIS CASE 
Defendants acknowledge on page 10 of their Brief that the 
Utah Supreme Court will probably recognize a cause of action for 
1 
wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Defendants 
1 
As of 1988, 35 states had allowed such claims, although the 
precise content of the cause of action varies among the states. 
Cummins v. EG & G Sealol, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 134 (D. R.I. 1988). 
One reason for the courts1 willingness to recognize such claims 
is that the employment at-will doctrine is, itself, a judicially 
created rule. Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp.., 396 N.W. 
2d, 588, 593 (Minn. App. 1986). 
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reasonably suggest that the cause of action should be limited 
to "substantial and important public policies", but Defendants 
make no claim that Plaintiff has failed to assert such a policy 
in this case. 
Defendants have raised three arguments in opposition 
to Plaintiff's claim for wrongful termination: (1) That such 
claims should not be allowed where a statutory remedy exists 
for the asserted policy. (Brief of Appellees, Sec. I, pages 
10-18); (2) that such claims should not he allowed where there 
is a contractual remedy for the alleged misconduct, i.e., the 
employment is not "at will" (Brief of Appellees, Sec. II, pages 
18-23); and (3) that the claim in this case is pre-empted by 
the exclusive remedy provision of the UADA. (Brief of Appel-
lees, Sec. Ill, pages 23-27). Defendants1 Brief tends to mix 
these arguments and the authorities cited Ln support thereof, 
but the arguments are conceptually distinct. 
Plaintiff recognizes that the courts disagree as to 
whether a cause of action for wrongful termination will lie 
where the alleged misconduct constitutes a violation of state 
anti-discrimination statutes, although Plaintiff believes that 
the reasoning of the cases which support her position is far 
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2 
superior to the contrary authorities. There is no support 
for Defendants' conclusion that the purpose of the UADA was 
to protect discriminating employers by establishing a short 
Plaintiff's position is the majority position. Cummins v. 
EG & G Sealol, Inc., 690 F. Supp. at 137-138, indicates that 
a minority of the states which have adopted the public 
policy-based cause of action limit it to circumstances in 
which there is no other remedy. See also cases cited in 
Plaintiff's Brief at page 27, note 2. Most of the cases 
which are cited in Defendants' Brief on this point were 
analyzed within Plaintiff's Brief at pages 40-51. Defendants 
continue to cite cases which do not reflect the current state 
of the law within their jurisdictions, e.g., Schroeder v. 
Dayton-Hudson Corp., 448 F. Supp. 910 (D. Mich. 1978), and 
Mahoney v. Crocker Natl. Bank, 571 F. Supp. 287 (D. Calif. 
1983). Defendants cite 5 new cases in their Brief: Lapinad v. 
Pacific Oldsmobile-GMC, Inc., 679 F.Supp. 991 (D. Haw. 1988); 
Salazar v. Furr's, Inc., 629 F.Supp. 1403 (D. N.M. 1986); 
Wolk v. Saks Fifth Ave. Inc., 728 F.2d 221 (3rd Cir. 1984); 
Harrison v. Edison Bros. Apparel Stores, Inc., 724 F. Supp. 
1185 (D. N.C. 1989); and Grzyb v. Evans, 700 S.W.2d 399 
(Ky. 1985). Of these, Lapinad was a misapplication of 
Hawaii law. See Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 
P.2d 625 (Haw. 1982); Lui v. Intercontinental Hotels 
Corp., 634 F. Supp. 684 (D. Haw. 1986); and Leong v. 
Hilton Hotels, 689 F. Supp. 1565 (D. Haw. 1988). The 
vitality of Salazar is questionable, since the case 
upon which it relied has been overruled. See Chavez 
v. Manville Products Corp., 777 P.2d 371 (N.M. 1989) 
(overruling Vigil v. Arzola, 699 P.2d 613 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 1983)). Wolk is another Pennsylvania case con-
trolled by that state's unique statutory provisions. 
(See Plaintiff's Brief at page 40, note 7). Harrison. 
Lapinad, and Grzyb are all cases in which the only policy 
asserted was that established by the anti-discrimination 
statutes, whereas in the present case, the asserted policy 
arises from Article IV, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution, 
and numerous statutory prohibitions against employment 
retaliation, including two former provisions of the Utah 
Labor Code. 
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limitations period (Appellees1 Brief, page 13). The purpose 
of the UADA, like Title VII which expressly does not preclude 
cumulative*remedies, is to prevent and remedy employment dis-
crimination, Beehive Medical Electronics, Inc., v. Industrial 
Commission, 583 P.2d 53, 60 (Ut. 1978), and that purpose is 
furthered by allowing the claim which Plaintiff asserts in 
3 
this case. The UADA should be construed to provide a 
Since the filing of Plaintiff's principal Brief, at least 
two opinions have been issued which support Plaintiff's 
position. In Call v. Scott Brass, Inc., 553 N.E. 2d, 1225 
(Ind. App. 1990), the Court held that the plaintiff, who was 
terminated for reporting for jury duty, was not limited to 
the statutory remedies for such termination, which included 
reinstatement and back pay. The Court's decision was based 
upon its finding that in Indiana the cause of action 
for wrongful termination preceded the enactment of the 
statutory remedy. However, the Court proceeded to state 
in dicta that it probably would have allowed the common-
law claim in any event, because the statute contained no 
pre-emptory language. This same rationale was applied in 
the other new case, Greeley v. Miami Valley Maint. Contr., 
551 N.E. 2d 981 (Ohio 1990), wherein the Court held that a 
statute which provided criminal penalties for employment 
termination resulting from an order to withhold child support 
did not pre-empt civil remedies: ("Had the General Assembly 
intended to bar a civil remedy...it certainly knew how to do 
so.") Other courts have applied this reasoning, e.g., 
Lally v. Copygraphics, 428 A.2d 1317, 1319 (N.J. 1981): 
("If the Legislature had wanted to foreclose a judicial 
cause of action, it would have done so expressly.") 
Wiggins v. Associated Coal Corp., 357 S.E.2d 745, 748 (W. Va. 
1987). (Silence of anti-discrimination statutes regarding 
exclusivity led to allowance of tort claim). McCool v. Hill-
haven Corp., 777 P.2d 1013, 1015 (Ore. App. 1989): ("We will 
not read such a limitation into the statute without its con-
taining a clear statement to that effect."). 
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cumulative, elective administrative remedy which employees 
may use if they so choose. 
Regardless of the merits of various positions which 
have been taken in regard to the availability of public 
policy-based claims arising from employment retaliation, if 
the language of an anti-discrimination statute expressly 
defines the extent of its exclusivity, the statutory language 
obviously controls. In the present case, the UADA specifi-
cally exempts employment retaliation from its exclusive remedy 
provision, thereby indicating that claims for retaliation, 
unlike claims of discrimination, may be brought without initial 
recourse to the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division (UADD). 
Defendants attempt to explain the absence of retaliation 
from the UADA's exclusive remedy provision by arguing that 
retaliation is merely included within the definition of 
discrimination. However, if that were the correct construc-
tion of the exclusive remedy provision, there would be a 
period after the word "discrimination"; The rest of the 
statute would be surplusage. Further, the UADA contains a 
detailed definition of the word "retaliate", Utah Code Anno-
tated (UCA), Section 34-35-2(15), in language which closely 
parallels that of Title VII's Anti-Retaliation Statute, which 
Defendants concede provides a distinct remedy from employment 
discrimination under Title VII. Defendants' Brief at page 24. 
The UADA's definition of "retaliate" does not imply that the 
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term is intended to be subsumed within the definition of dis-
crimination • Further, UCA Section 34-35-61! 1) (a) (i), states 
in part: 
(1) It is a discriminatory or prohibited employment 
practice: 
(a)(i) for an employer to refuse to hire, or 
promote or to discharge, demote, terminate 
any person, oi? to retaliate against, gr_ 
discriminate in matters of compensation 
or in terms, privileges, and conditions 
of employment against any person other-
wise qualified, because of race, color, 
sex, age, if the individual is 40 years 
of age or older, religion, national 
origin, or handicap...(emphasis added). 
The statute implies that there are "prohibited employment 
practices" under the UADA which do not constitute "discrimin-
ation" and one of those prohibited practices is "to retaliate". 
Under Defendants' construction of the statute, the phrase "or 
to retaliate against" is surplusage, because retaliation is 
included within the word "discriminate". 
Moreover, UCA Sec. 34-35-6(1)(a)(i) prohibits discrimin-
ation "because of race, color, sex, age...", etc. Retaliation 
does not occur because of one of these factors, but because of 
the employee's engagement in protected activity. For example, 
in the present case, Defendants did not retaliate against Plain-
tiff "because of" her sex, but because Plaintiff complained 
about the advances of Jolene Gailey. This is a critical 
- 10 -
4 
distinction which has been made by several courts and which 
Defendants completely ignore in their Brief. 
Perhaps the most significant point in construing the UADA 
in this case is that the UADA's exclusive remedy provision was 
amended by the Utah Legislature in its 1990 Session, effective 
April 23, 1990, to read as follows: 
The procedures contained in this section 
are the exclusive remedy under state law 
for employment discrimination based upon 
race, color, sex, retaliationt pregnancy, 
child birth, or pregnancy-related conditions, 
age, religion, national origin, or handicap. 
(Emphas i s added)• 
This amendment effectively negates Defendants1 argument 
that retaliation is included within the definition of dis-
crimination, because if that were the case, the 1990 amendment 
of the UADA to add retaliation to its exclusive remedy pro-
vision would be superfluous. Such an interpretation would be 
contrary to the general rules of statutory construction. 
Ro.jo v. Kliger, 257 Cal. Rptr. 158, 163 (Cal. App. 1989). 
If the UADA does provide the exclusive remedy for 
Plaintiff in this case, there are serious questions about 
4 
See cases cited on pages 38-39 of Plaintiff's Brief. The 
Washington Supreme Court has recently made a similar 
distinction in Bennett v. Hardy, 784 P.2d 1258 (Wash. 
1990). 
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the Act's constitutionality under Article IV, Sec. 1 of the 
Utah Constitution, which states: 
The rights of citizens of the State of Utah 
to vote and hold office shall not be denied 
or abridged on account of sex. Both male 
and female citizens of this State shall 
enjoy equally all civil, political, and 
religious rights and privileges. 
Defendants attempt to minimize this provision upon page 
17 of their Brief by stating that it "merely" guarantees the 
right to vote and hold office and that males and females will 
be equal in civil, political, and religious rights and privi-
leges. Plaintiff submits that employment, and particularly 
the right to be free from sex discrimination in employment, 
is a civil right within the state of Utah. Further, Article 
IV, Sec. 1 is more than just "in harmony" with the UADA, it 
is the constitutional authority which validates the UADA's 
prohibition upon sex discrimination. Beehive Medical Elec-
tronics, Inc., v. Industrial Commission, 583 at 61. To the 
extent that the UADA pre-empts any remedy for injuries which 
Plaintiff has sustained through Defendants1 sex discrimination 
or retaliation, the UADA is in violation of Article IV, Sec. 1 
and Article I, Sec. 11 (the "open door provision") of the Utah 
Constitution. 
Plaintiff also recognizes that a few cases have held 
that the policy-based action for wrongful termination will 
not lie where the employee has a contractual remedy, i.e., 
is not an at-will employee. This is clearly a minority 
- 12 -
5 
position, and makes little practical sense. It makes no 
sense to limit contract employees to the remedies which are 
provided in their contracts, which may be as limited as their 
employers like, where the employer has acted in violation of 
public policy, while allowing at-will employees to recover 
full tort or contract damages. Further, considering the 
present law in regard to implied employment contracts, it is 
impossible to predict whether a particular employee is at-will 
or not. Limiting the policy-based claim to at-will employees 
will confuse employees and employers alike as to what their 
rights are under state law. 
The essential purpose of the public policy-based action 
is not to provide a remedy for at-will employees, but to protect 
vital state interests. Petermann v. International Brotherhood 
of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. App. 1959). At-will 
employees would not need a remedy but for improper conduct of 
their employers. The cases supporting Defendants1 position 
tacitly acknowledge this, but hold that the contractual 
remedy is adequate to vindicate the public interest. But 
5 
All of the authorities cited by Defendants on this point 
were discussed on pages 27-35 of Plaintiff's Brief, and 
the authority in support of Defendants1 position is sparse 
indeed. Some of the cases supporting Plaintiff's position 
on this issue are cited in Plaintiff's principal Brief at 
page 32, note 4. 
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the contract remedy may not be adequate. The employer defines 
the content of its policy, often on an ad hoc basis, and that 
policy may be well short of what is in the public's interest. 
Further, the contractual procedures or remedies may be insuf-
ficient to vindicate the public's interest,, or to make the 
plaintiff whole. For example, the contracts in the present 
case provide no remedy for Defendants' intentionally harassing 
Plaintiff into an emotional disability. The enforcement of 
vital state policies should not be left to private employers. 
Nor should this Court perpetuate the legal fiction of 
reading an "implied-in-law" exception into all contracts (includ-
ing "at-will" non-contracts) of employment. The public policy 
6 
action should be recognized for what it is — a tort claim. 
6 
Many courts have specifically held to this effect. Greeley 
v. Miami Valley Maint. Contr.f 551 N.E. 2d at 987; Wiggins 
v. Assoc. Coal Corp., 357 S.E. 2d at 747; Parnar v. Americana 
Hotels, 652 P.2d at 629; Dare v. Montana Petrol Mkg. Co., 
687 P.2d 1015, 1019 (Mont. 1984); Holien v. Sears, Roebuck 
& Co., 689 P.2d 1292, 1300 (Ore. 1984); Midgett v. Sackett-
Chicago, Inc., 473 N.E. 2d 1280 (111. 1984); Phipps v. Clark 
Oil & Refining, 408 N.W. 2d 569, 572 (Minn. 1987); Greiss v. 
Consolidated Freightways Corp., 776 P.2d 752, 754 (Wyo. 1989). 
In fact, the disagreement among the courts as to whether a 
remedy for wrongful termination lies in tort or contract seems 
to relate specifically to the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing, and not to claims which rely specifically 
on public policy. See e.g., K-Mart Corp. v. Posneck, supra; 
Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem. Hosp. 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 
1985); and Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co., 778 P.2d 744 
(Idaho 1989). Even where a wrongful termination initially 
sounds in contract, it may rise to the level of a tort based 
upon the egregiousness of the employer's conduct. K-Mart Corp. 
v. Posneck, 732 P.2d at 1370, Wagenseller, 710 P.2d at 1039. 
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On pages 25-26 of their Brief, Defendants argue that 
Plaintiff's claims are barred under the construction of the 
UADA which was set forth in Davis v. Utah Power & Light Co* 
Civ. No. 87-C-0659G (D. Utah 1988). In Davis, Judge Greene 
held that the UADA pre-empts "only...those causes of action 
which are based upon the very conduct which is necessary to 
prove sexual harassment or sex discrimination under the Act." 
7 
Id. at 12. Based on this analysis, Judge Greene ruled that 
the plaintiff's claims for emotional distress and negligent 
employment were not pre-empted, and that the plaintiff's 
implied contract claim was pre-empted. 
None of Plaintiff's claims are pre-empted in the present 
case because they arise from retaliation, and not sex discrim-
ination, and the UADA did not purport to be the exclusive 
remedy for retaliation prior to its amendment in 1990. Fur-
ther, Plaintiff's claims for emotional distress, negligent 
employment, and interference are not pre-empted under the 
7 
This same construction of the UADA was applied by Judge 
Greene in the case of Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 735 F. 
Supp. 381 (D. Utah 1990). 
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Davis rule because they are distinct tort claims with elements 
8 
which substantially differ from employment discrimination. 
In regard to the implied contract claim, Plaintiff 
submits that Judge Greene's dismissal of that claim upon 
summary judgment in Davis was error. An employer's policy 
concerning discrimination or retaliation may or may not be co-
extensive with that established by state law. For example, 
employers may adopt an affirmative-action policy, or may 
provide seniority protection for older workers. In such 
cases, the appropriate action for breach of the employer's 
policy would be an action for breach of contract, not for 
employment discrimination. Yatvin v. Madison Metropolitan 
School Dist.t 840 F.2d 412, 415 (7th Cir. 1988). The content 
of AT&T's policy against employment discrimination and retalia-
tion is an issue of fact which should not have been summarily 
dismissed. 
8 
Plaintiff's claim for wrongful termination in violation of 
public policy is also a distinct tort claim, with a burden 
of proof and potential remedies which substantially differ 
from a claim of employment discrimination. Berube v. Fashion 
Centre Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1042 (Utah, 1989); Helmick v. 
Cincinnati Word Processing, 543 N.E.2d 1212, 1216 (Ohio, 
1989). 
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P L A I N T I F F ' S CLAIMS ARE NOT PRE-EMPTED BY FEDERAL LABOR LAW 
I '"•" l .n iMle v . N o r g e D \\ , I - r+ mil ( 1 9 8 8 ) " l « 
United States Sup rem-- t r t h e l d thai , c l a i m s w h i c h a r i s e f rom 
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< q u u e a s u b s t a n t i a l a n a l y s i s of I hv i«i>«H t»t a c o l l e o -
* j v e mrfc ja in ing Hgre<*menl 11 i not p r e - e m p t e d Nv Sen ill I nil I I i 
•Maiiiitif'iiii'iil In i i * i I mi ii in i in JJ i n g l e i u i t h e i lit id m a t 
K.^rf fat t t h a t d e t e r m i n a t i o n ( ' h e s t a t e c l a i m may de\ v\ J 
ht1 4HIJIN1 f a c t u a l a n a l y s i s aff :i n o t f n t mil MM " i I I 
1 1 II mi mi mi i 1 1 mi ii II i n 1 1 in mi 11 mi in mi II mi ini a I. .I i L L l a i in • i l l . a i i 6 i 9 , * -~ 
.it-1 e tiie state claim requires an analysis I" the collects -
bargaining agreement i Ms*1 1 (' " •< I !• > I "j» t < I i I HI ("" ," • e i u p l e d 
in il  II I ,n , Lingle addressed the very issue thai, is 
presented in the present case, and strongly implied that claims 
arising from sMiM" u»( • ^  i M •• \ HH n ' i hi «', M M . n"' pre-empted. 
I li i H position is consistent with I he general rule that anti-
discrimination laws arc independent nnd cumulative V I M -H S, IS 
l he I.MP »Lexandei ^ , Uard11er -Den ver <Jo . , Hit I , 4836 
i n M i ; Jackson v. Consolidated Rail Corp* , 5 38 A, 2d 13 I 0, 
,1325-26 I M . <M Ajjjj, 1388). ^^^ r«.ou majority of » risen lirivr-
that claims such as those which Plaintiff has alleged in this 
9 
action are not pre-empted under the LMRA. Plaintiff's claims 
arise from independent rights under state law, which are non-
negotiable and apply equally to union and non-union employees. 
Her claims invoke vital aspects of state policy of which the 
state courts may take cognizance. 
9 
See cases cited on pages 57-63 of Plaintiff's Brief. Other 
cases so holding include: Malia v. RCA Corp., 794 F.2d at 909 
(emotional distress, interference); Jackson v. So. Cal. Gas. 
Co., 881 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1989) (public policy action aris-
ing from race discrimination); Ackerman v. Western Elec. Co., 
860 F.2d 1514 (9th Cir. 1988) (handicap discrimination); 0* 
Shea v. Detroit News, 887 F.2d 683 (6th Cir. 1989) (age dis-
crimination and emotional distress); Dougherty v. Parsec, 
872 F.2d 766 (6th Cir. 1989) (interference); Panto.ia v. Texas 
Gas, 890 F.2d 955 (7th Cir. 1989) (public policy action aris-
ing from filing of prior suit); Malone v. Safeway Stores, 
698 F. Supp. 207 (D. Ore. 1987) (religious discrimination 
and emotional distress); Glass Molders v. Wickes Companies, 
707 F. Supp. 174 (D. N.J. 1989) (interference). Most of the 
cases cited by Defendants are Ninth Circuit cases, which 
must be read in conjunction with the Ninth Circuit cases 
which are cited herein for an understanding of the law in 
that jurisdiction. The Dinger and Magnuson cases discussed 
on page 39 of Defendants' Brief were based upon the pre-
Lingle rule of pre-emption which held that state claims 
were pre-empted under the LMRA if they could have been 
asserted through the union grievance procedure. Lingle 
makes it clear that it makes no difference whether the 
same facts could support either a state law claim or a 
Sec. 301 claim. The essential question is whether the 
state claim may be adjudicated without a substantial 
reference to the collective bargaining agreement. 
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p o s s i b l i r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n P l a i n t i f f ' s c l a i m s anil ' h e 
C o l l e c t i v e B a r g a i n i n g Agree?" m • " ' l " ' i I n n 1 ' i n . . l e n -
I mi i mi i ii i i mi mi i i 'i IJ u i i ii i i i n a v e t< U f c i d e w h e t h e r »\ 1 k T 
p r o p e r l y d i s c i p l i n e d G a i l e y . Iinhnnon arid dfandsil I » and win I h e r 
B a t e s o n - H o u s h was >1 J / ' .<i J n i I i iiiiili'i i in1 
I1.'i . t r ^ a i L ^ . i , n^ie tn i ie i ^ e i e n d a n i s 1 B r i e f a t 3 8 - 3 7 . 
AI ^ F « L : n o t d i s c i p l i n e t h e i n d i v i d u a l d e f e n d m " ' 
a l l , s o Lh' i ( i i i i " ' i i i i, • I ' o l l e o L i v e B a r g a i n i n g 
A g r e e m e n t In HOC II" d i s c i p J i r iarv m e a s u r e s w e r e p r o p e r l y i m p o s e d . 
M o r e o v e r , Lliat i s s u e i s i r r e l e v a n t t i t in i n n n l i i i iiiiiiii MI i i m in in 
t i f f ' * - HI b l i ^ a i - L u i i undi-sr s t a t e Uin t o 
p ; u * t : i . .**M ~ i r e t a l i a t i o n , a n d B a t e s o n - H o u g h *<- . ^ r t ^ 
n o t " i - ' ^ho r i ze i l * > " H H l i n * f t * \ * «• 
D^t . ' i.vjii itr i - i e r e n t e , 
C o l l e c t i v e B a r g a i n i n g Agreemen* * e x i s t eno** * «* + *— 
d u t i e s , a n ^ ^ o i ^ ^ « - « 
fc - >>ctrgaining A g r e e m e n t - ,* - _•* » p e r l y 
a p p l i e d . 
With respect to Plaintiff's applied contract claim, 
Defendants do not contest the rule articulated within Cater-
pillar, Inc., v, Williams, 107 S. Ct. 2425 (1987), and Malia 
v. RCA Corp., 794 F.2d 909 (3rd Cir. 1986), that the LMRA 
does not require pre-emption of claims which arise from 
contracts that are independent from the collective bargain-
10 
ing agreement. 
As set forth in pages 59-60 of Plaintiff's Brief, 
AT&T's Code of Conduct certainly appears to establish an 
implied contract under the rule of Berube v. Fashion Centre, 
Ltd. The Code of Conduct contains no reference to the 
Collective Bargaining Agreement, or to the LMRA, nor does 
the Collective Bargaining Agreement contain any reference 
to the Code of Conduct. The only potential link between the 
two which Defendants have identified is the "exclusive agree-
ment" language in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. 
10 
Defendants attempt to distinguish Caterpillar and Malia from 
the present case in that Caterpillar and Malia involved man-
agement employees who were not under a collective bargaining 
agreement. Defendants' Brief at 35. That distinction does 
not appear anywhere within the opinions* Further, Defen-
dants ignore the other cases which are cited on page 59 
of Plaintiff's Brief, which did not involve management 
employees. The Eitmann case cited by Defendants merely 
found that the independent agreement in that case was pre-
empted because it was inconsistent with the collective 
bargaining agreement. Eitmann, 730 F.2d at 362. Other 
cases supporting Plaintiff's position include Windfield 
v. Groen Piv., 890 F.2d 764 (5th Cir. 1989) and Wells v. 
General Motors Corp.. 881 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989). 
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, INTIFF»S CLAIMS ARE NOT OTHERWISE BARRED 
With r e f e r e n c e t o D e f e n d a n t s ' firguun-'ni I ii i in »• m if 
P l a i n t i f f " i i Inim Inii inul hn, l i m i t a t i o n s , a n i s s u e o t f a n ! 
exists as to when those causes of action accrued. There is 
also a legal issue as to when limitations begins to run on 
claims for emotional distress, negligent employment, and 
interference, where the alleged conduct transpires over a 
period of time and does not cause injury until several tortious 
11 
incidents have accumulated. 
With reference to Defendants1 argument that Plaintiff 
has failed to allege sufficient facts to establish outrageous 
conduct or an intent to injure, the facts alleged in Plain-
tiff's Affidavit are more than sufficient to state a claim and 
to raise an issue of fact. Further, the development of the facts 
was precluded by the District Court's grant of Summary Judgment. 
Placos v. Cosmair, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 1287 (D. N.Y. 1981). 
With respect to Plaintiff's interference claims, Defen-
dants do not address the well-established rule that co-employees, 
including management employees, may be liable for interference 
12 
when they act out of malice, and that malice is an issue of fact. 
The interference which is alleged in this case is with AT&T's 
independent contractual obligation under the Code of Conduct. 
11 
This issue is demonstrated by the conflict between the cases 
of Leong v. Hilton Hotels, 689 F. Supp. at 1568 and Bruffet 
v. Warner Communications, Inc., 692 F.2d 910, 914 (3rd Cir. 
1982). 
12 
In addition to the cases which are cited on page 66 of 
Plaintiff's Brief, the following cases have applied this rule: 
Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d at 1043; 
Malia v. RCA Corp., 794 F.2d at 913. Zappa v. Seiver, 706 
P.2d 440 (Cal. App. 1985); Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 
461 F. Supp 894 (D. N.J. 1978); Tash v. Houston, 254 N.W.2d 
579 (Mich. App. 1977); Guyette v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 
518 F. Supp. 521 (D. N.J. 1981). 
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